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TRANSGENDER INMATES’ RIGHT TO GENDER
CONFIRMATION SURGERY
Marissa Luchs*
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. It
ensures that the state’s power to punish is exercised within the bounds of
evolving standards of human decency. At the time of its enactment in 1791,
the Eighth Amendment merely protected against torture and other physically
barbarous treatments. However, as society’s standards of decency changed,
so too did the scope of the Eighth Amendment. Today, among other
protections, the Eighth Amendment mandates that prisons provide inmates
with adequate conditions of confinement. This includes an obligation on the
part of the prison to provide adequate medical care. But a great deal of
controversy exists as to what exactly adequate medical care requires. In the
context of transgender inmates, circuit courts are split over the necessity of
providing gender confirmation surgery. While some courts believe that
blanket bans on such surgery are constitutional, others prescribe a case-bycase analysis to determine the constitutionality of a prison’s denial of gender
confirmation surgery. This Note explores the divergence between these two
approaches and argues that a case-by-case approach better comports with
both the historical confines of the Constitution and contemporary societal
values.
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INTRODUCTION
individuals1

Transgender
are incarcerated at a significantly higher rate
than their cisgender2 counterparts.3 Due to disproportionately high rates of
poverty among transgender communities and discriminatory profiling, one in
six transgender individuals will be incarcerated during their lifetime.4 Once
imprisoned, transgender individuals are among the most vulnerable inmates
in the prison population.5 These inmates are subjected to unprecedented rates
1. Transgender individuals are those whose gender identity is different from their “sex
assigned at birth.” Transgender Identity Terms and Labels, PLANNED PARENTHOOD,
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/gender-identity/transgender/transgender-identityterms-and-labels [https://perma.cc/7V6C-AGWL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
2. Cisgender individuals identify with the “sex they were assigned at birth.” Id.
3. See Tara Dunnavant, Note, Bye-Bye Binary: Transgender Prisoners and the
Regulation of Gender in the Law, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV., no. 1, 2016, at 15, 19.
4. Id.
5. See Richard Edney, To Keep Me Safe from Harm?: Transgender Prisoners and the
Experience of Imprisonment, 9 DEAKIN L. REV. 327, 328 (2004).
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of abuse and harassment, not only from other inmates but also from the prison
authorities themselves.6
The challenges faced by transgender inmates are visible in many different
forms. For one, many transgender inmates are subjected to “humiliation and
degradation” from prison staff and other prisoners.7 Transgender inmates are
considered “the lowest rung on the totem pole” and, as a result, endure verbal
and physical abuse.8
Further, transgender prisoners often fall victim to sexual abuse.9
Approximately 40 percent of transgender inmates report being sexually
assaulted while imprisoned.10 This rate of abuse is ten times greater than that
of the general prison population.11 This partly results from prison policies
that place inmates in facilities in accordance with their genitalia and birthassigned sex rather than by their gender identities.12
To compound the problem, transgender inmates often cannot seek
protection. Prison officials generally “turn a blind eye” to these abuses and
sometimes even encourage them.13 In fact, transgender inmates are five
times more likely than cisgender inmates to be sexually abused by prison
staff.14 If prison authorities seek to rectify this mistreatment at all, they often
place the transgender inmate in solitary confinement.15 This can cause
serious psychological harm and trauma equivalent to that of torture.16

6. See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., LGBTQ PEOPLE BEHIND BARS: A GUIDE
TO UNDERSTANDING THE ISSUES FACING TRANSGENDER PRISONERS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS,

6
(2018),
https://transequality.org/sites/default/files/docs/resources/TransgenderPeople
BehindBars.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9BD-HJVG].
7. Id.
8. Tammi S. Etheridge, Safety v. Surgery: Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Housing
of Transgender Inmates, 15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 585, 601 (2014) (quoting SYLVIA RIVERA L.
PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN HERE”: A REPORT ON THE TREATMENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX
PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE MEN’S PRISONS 26 (2007), https://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VY2E-Q6WB])).
9. See Dunnavant, supra note 3, at 19.
10. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 6, at 6.
11. Id.
12. Dunnavant, supra note 3, at 19.
13. See Darren Rosenblum, Trapped in Sing Sing: Transgendered Prisoners Caught in
the Gender Binarism, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 499, 525 (2000).
14. SANDY E. JAMES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., THE REPORT OF THE
2015 U.S. TRANSGENDER SURVEY 192 (2017), https://transequality.org/sites/default
/files/docs/usts/USTS-Full-Report-Dec17.pdf [https://perma.cc/F689-SFCB].
15. NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., supra note 6, at 6.
16. Id.
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Additionally, transgender inmates, specifically those with gender
dysphoria,17 face serious barriers to receiving adequate medical care.18
These inmates often seek hormone therapy, counseling, gender confirmation
surgery (GCS), and other transition-related accommodations to alleviate their
dysphoria.19 However, prison officials commonly block access to such
treatment through restrictive policies such as “freeze-frames” and blanket
bans.20
In an effort to combat these oppressive policies, gender dysphoric inmates
have sought recourse under the Eighth Amendment.21 The Eighth
Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.22 The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that the Eighth Amendment requires prisons to provide
inmates with conditions of confinement that comport with evolving standards
of decency.23
In litigation, gender dysphoric inmates have asserted that a prison’s failure
to provide transition-related medical care violates the Eighth Amendment.24
While courts generally have acknowledged some duty on the part of prisons
to provide transition-related care, the extent of such duty remains contested.25
Specifically, much debate surrounds prisons’ obligation to provide GCS.26
Without any guidance from the Supreme Court, circuit courts have been
left to determine the constitutionality of prisons’ denial of GCS.27 The circuit
courts first addressed this issue in Kosilek v. Spencer.28 Although the First

17. Gender dysphoria is a medical condition characterized by significant distress or
impairment resulting from an incongruence between one’s gender identity and sex assigned at
birth. See infra Part I.C.1. Some, but not all, transgender individuals suffer from gender
dysphoria. Jack Drescher, et al., Expert Q & A: Gender Dysphoria, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N,
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/expert-q-and-a
[https://perma.cc/XZ95-Z86B] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). This Note focuses specifically on
the Eighth Amendment remedies available for gender dysphoric inmates.
18. See Samantha Braver, Note, Circuit Court Dysphoria: The Status of Gender
Confirmation Surgery Requests by Incarcerated Transgender Individuals, 120 COLUM. L.
REV. 2235, 2247 (2020) (stating that it is exceedingly difficult for transgender inmates,
particularly gender dysphoric inmates, to receive proper medical care).
19. See Yvette K. W. Bourcicot & Daniel Hirotsu Woofter, Prudent Policy:
Accommodating Prisoners with Gender Dysphoria, 12 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 283, 286, 304
(2016).
20. See Transgender Incarcerated People in Crisis, LAMBDA LEGAL,
https://www.lambdalegal.org/know-your-rights/article/trans-incarcerated-people
[https://perma.cc/3B2W-GPE9] (last visited Apr. 14, 2021). “Freeze-frame” policies “freeze
treatment options for incarcerated transgender individuals at the level of treatment they
received prior to their incarceration.” Braver, supra note 18, at 2247.
21. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Kallas, 895 F.3d 492 (7th Cir. 2018); Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d
550 (7th Cir. 2011); De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2003).
22. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
24. See infra Part I.C.
25. See Jordan Rogers, Note, Being Transgender Behind Bars in the Era of Chelsea
Manning: How Transgender Prisoners’ Rights Are Changing, 6 ALA. C.R. & C.L.L. REV.
189, 195 (2015).
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Parts II, III.
28. 774 F.3d 63 (1st Cir. 2014).
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Circuit’s holding in Kosilek was clear—the prison’s denial of GCS did not
amount to cruel and unusual punishment—the implications are more
obscure.29 Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have relied on Kosilek in
deciding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS; however, these
circuits are split on the issue.30 On the one hand, in Gibson v. Collier,31 the
Fifth Circuit held that a prison’s blanket ban on GCS is constitutional because
such surgery is never medically necessary.32 On the other hand, in Edmo v.
Corizon, Inc.,33 the Ninth Circuit found a similar blanket ban on GCS
unconstitutional on the basis that such treatment can be medically
necessary.34 Accordingly, Edmo urged courts to undertake a case-by-case
analysis to assess whether a prison’s denial of GCS constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment.35
This Note examines the aforementioned circuit split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits in the context of the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that
punishments comport with evolving standards of decency. In doing so, this
Note not only addresses the requirements for bringing an Eighth Amendment
inadequate medical care claim but also explores whether there is a place for
blanket bans within larger Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Finally, this
Note discusses this circuit split within its larger societal framework in an
attempt to gauge contemporary standards of decency, considering both the
increased accessibility and acceptance of GCS, and the overarching national
movement to promote civil rights.
Part I of this Note provides the framework for understanding the Eighth
Amendment claims brought by transgender inmates. Specifically, Parts I.A
and I.B discusses the foundations of the Eighth Amendment, its connection
to the evolving standards of decency, and its application to inadequate
medical care claims. Part I.C then explores the conditions that prompt
transgender inmates to bring such claims. Part II discusses Kosilek, the first
case in which a circuit court addressed whether a transgender inmate has an
Eighth Amendment right to GCS and explains Kosilek’s importance in the
current circuit split. Next, Part III explores the split between the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of prisons’ denial of GCS.
Lastly, Part IV takes the position that a blanket ban is contrary to the evolving
standards of decency, incompatible with existing Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, inconsistent with the consensus among the medical
community, and also a product of flawed case law. As a result, this part sides
with Edmo and urges courts to engage in a case-by-case analysis.

29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part III.
31. 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.).
32. Id. at 223, 228.
33. 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020),
stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in
chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020).
34. See id. at 796–97.
35. Id. at 796.
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I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING TRANSGENDER INMATES’
EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS
This part provides the foundation for understanding the Eighth
Amendment claims brought by transgender inmates. Part I.A introduces the
Eighth Amendment. Part I.A discusses the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishment, explains how courts have used this
language to challenge both prisoners’ sentences and conditions of
confinement, and highlights the importance of adhering to evolving standards
of decency. Part I.B then explores a frequently challenged condition of
confinement—inadequate medical care—and lays out the two-prong test
plaintiffs must satisfy to successfully establish such claims. Part I.C then
focuses specifically on the context in which transgender inmates may bring
inadequate medical care claims. Namely, Part I.C.1 explains gender
dysphoria, a condition for which transgender inmates seek treatment from
prisons, and Part I.C.2 discusses GCS, the treatment typically sought.
A. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.”36 It
ensures that the state’s power to punish convicted criminals is “exercised
within the limits of civilized standards.”37
While originally drafted to protect against “physically barbarous
treatment,” over time, courts have extended the Eighth Amendment’s
protections beyond mere physical torture.38 Today, a wide range of
government actions have been held to violate Eighth Amendment scrutiny.39
Firstly, prisoners have successfully relied on the Eighth Amendment to
challenge the constitutionality of their sentences.40 Sentences are deemed
“cruel and unusual” when they are “‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
36. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
37. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
38. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976). The Eighth Amendment originally
addressed “torture, such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot, the stretching of limbs and
the like.” Ryan Dischinger, Note, Adequate Care for a Serious Medical Need: Kosilek v.
Spencer Begins the Path Toward Ensuring Inmates Receive Treatment for Gender Dysphoria,
22 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 169, 171 (2013) (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339
(1892) (Field, J., dissenting)).
39. See, e.g., Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 38, 40 (2010) (holding that punching,
kicking, choking, and overall excessive physical force by a corrections officer against a
prisoner constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 57071 (2005) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for criminal
offenders under the age of eighteen); Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126–27 (2d Cir. 2013)
(holding that exposing prisoners to extreme temperatures, preventing prisoners from sleeping,
providing unsanitary conditions, and failing to provide toiletries and other hygienic materials
may all constitute “cruel and unusual punishments”).
40. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 884 (2009) (stating that the Eighth Amendment limits the “criminal
sentences the state may impose”); see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 575; Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (determining that inflicting the death penalty on an intellectually
disabled person would be cruel and unusual punishment).
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crime,”41 are “totally without penological justification,”42 or “involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”43
Secondly, prisoners also invoke the Eighth Amendment to challenge their
conditions of confinement.44 In Estelle v. Gamble,45 the Supreme Court
established that certain deprivations suffered during imprisonment constitute
“cruel and unusual punishments” when a prison acts with deliberate
indifference toward an inmate’s serious need.46 Such deprivations include
failure to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, or medical care.47
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment cannot be assessed in a
vacuum. Courts must evaluate punishments in accordance with the Eighth
Amendment’s “broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency.”48 What may have been “cruel and unusual” at the
time of the Eighth Amendment’s enactment in 1791 may be very different
than what is cruel and unusual today.49 As such, courts look to the “evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society” when
determining the constitutionality of a punishment.50 A punishment is cruel
and unusual if it is inconsistent with society’s current standard of decency.51
As societal notions of decency are constantly changing, so too are the
actions deemed cruel and unusual.52 To navigate this complexity, courts
generally look to objective indicia of society’s standards to determine the
national consensus regarding a particular punishment.53 Such objective
indicia include legislative enactments, state practices, and recent trends in the
law indicating a change in direction.54 A national consensus denouncing a
41. Dolovich, supra note 40, at 883–84 (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592
(1977)).
42. Id. at 884 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Retribution,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation are penological goals sufficient to justify a
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010).
43. Dolovich, supra note 40, at 884 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
44. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating that the Eighth Amendment
could be applied beyond sentencing to deprivations suffered during imprisonment).
45. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297.
47. See Dischinger, supra note 38, at 171 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832
(1994)); see also, e.g., Ball v. LeBlanc, 792 F.3d 584, 596 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding that
housing vulnerable inmates in hot cells without access to “heat-relief measures” is
unconstitutional); Reed v. McBride, 178 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating that knowingly
depriving a prisoner of food for three to five days violates the Eighth Amendment).
48. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.
1968)).
49. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008).
50. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
51. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
52. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910) (explaining that the Eighth
Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice”).
53. Rachael Rezabek, Note, (D)evolving Standards of Decency: The Unworkability of
Current Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence as Illustrated by Kosilek v. Spencer, 87 S. CAL. L.
REV. 389, 399 (2014).
54. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A.2 (identifying specific objective indicia relevant in
assessing medical treatments).
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particular punishment supports a finding that such punishment is not in line
with civilized standards, decency, and humanity and thus, violates the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.55
B. Inadequate Medical Care Claims
The adequacy of medical care is a condition of confinement that is
frequently challenged.56 Because inmates have no choice but to rely on the
prison to treat their medical needs, a prison’s failure to do so can cause
serious pain, suffering, physical torture, or even death.57 In Estelle, the Court
held that a prison inflicts cruel and unusual punishment when it acts with
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical need.58 This requires
a two-prong showing.59
First, a prisoner must satisfy an objective prong that requires proof of a
“serious medical need.”60 A serious medical need is one “diagnosed by a
physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”61 Once
a prisoner demonstrates a serious medical need, this prong also requires a
showing that the prison provided inadequate medical care.62 A prison facility
need not provide the most ideal treatment or even the one the prisoner prefers,
but the treatment provided must be “at a level reasonably commensurate with
modern medical science and of a quality acceptable within prudent
professional standards.”63
If the treatment provided was adequate, it does not matter that another
medical professional might have prescribed a different course of care.64 If a
treatment is deemed medically necessary, however, then no other care will
be deemed adequate.65 It follows that a prison cannot issue a blanket ban on
55. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002) (finding that a punishment was cruel
and unusual where there was a national consensus against it).
56. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 n.1 (1991) (stating that courts have “routinely”
applied the Eighth Amendment to deprivations of medical care).
57. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
58. Id. at 104.
59. Sarah Halbach, Comment, Framing a Narrative of Discrimination Under the Eighth
Amendment in the Context of Transgender Prisoner Health Care, 105 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 463, 475 (2015).
60. Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2014). Besides gender dysphoria, other
examples of recognized “serious medical needs” include “swollen ankles, inability to sleep,
chills, tingling and numbness of hands, hyperventilation, severe back and leg pain, and double
vision.” Loadholt v. Moore, 844 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1279 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Ancata ex rel.
Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 702–03 (11th Cir. 1985)).
61. Guadreault v. Municipality of Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990).
62. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 85.
63. See United States v. DeCologero, 821 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1987).
64. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 786 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020).
65. Bethany L. Edmondson, Note, Trans-lating the Eighth Amendment Standard: The
First Circuit’s Denial of a Transgender Prisoner’s Constitutional Right to Medical Treatment,
51 GA. L. REV. 585, 592 (2017).
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a medically necessary treatment where no other treatment will suffice.66
Therefore, determining the necessity of the treatment is critical in assessing
the validity of these claims. Standards of care and practice in the medical
community are extremely important in this analysis.67
Once prisoners fulfill this objective prong, they must then satisfy a
subjective prong.68 This requires proof that the prison was deliberately
indifferent to that need.69 This component is fulfilled if the prisoner can
prove that a prison official knew of and consciously disregarded a substantial
risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health or safety.70 Thus, mere negligence
or inadvertence alone is not enough to prove deliberate indifference.71 On
the other hand, actual malice by the prison is not required.72 The prisoner
need not prove that “a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm
actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed
to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.”73
In considering this subjective prong, “security considerations inherent in
the functioning of a penological institution must be given significant
weight.”74 Thus, even denials of necessary medical care may not rise to the
level of deliberate indifference if the prison based its decision on a legitimate
concern for prisoner safety and security.75
Finally, like all Eighth Amendment claims, inadequate medical care claims
must be decided in the context of evolving standards of decency.76 However,
the deceny analysis is not confined to either of the two prongs.77 Instead,
66. See Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 556, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting a prison’s
blanket ban on hormone therapy after finding that there was no “adequate replacement” for
the treatment).
67. Edmo, 935 F.3d at 786.
68. Perry v. Roy, 782 F.3d 73, 78 (1st Cir. 2015).
69. Id.
70. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); see also Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d
859, 865–66 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that failure to treat an inmate’s shotgun wound for four
days amounted to deliberate indifference where the prison was aware of the injury and the
delay in treatment caused “unnecessary pain as a result of a readily treatable condition”); Gill
v. Mooney, 824 F.2d 192, 195–96 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding guards’ conscious refusal to follow
a physician’s orders and provide an inmate access to the prison’s exercise facilities constituted
deliberate indifference to his neck and back pain); Nolet v. Armstrong, 197 F. Supp. 3d 298,
306 (D. Mass. 2016) (determining a prison nurse was deliberately indifferent to an inmate
when she failed to refer the inmate “for further or additional treatment for his wound, despite
observing Plaintiff’s wound for several months [and] seeing infection and [a lack of
healing]”).
71. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835.
72. Carrie S. Frank, Note, Must Inmates Be Provided Free Organ Transplants?:
Revisiting the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 341, 352 (2005)
(noting that deliberate indifference requires “something more than negligence, but less than
malice”).
73. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
74. Kosilek v. Spencer , 774 F.3d 63, 83 (1st Cir. 2014).
75. Id.
76. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
77. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411

2818

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

standards of decency are the benchmark against which each inquiry must be
made, a thread woven throughout the entire decision.78 Only by considering
evolving standards of decency can courts determine what a serious medical
need is, whether there was any deliberate indifference, and ultimately, what
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.79 Despite the importance of
adhering to evolving standards of decency, curiously, courts often do not
explicitly examine objective indicia of society’s standards.80 Accordingly, it
is often hard to pinpoint both exactly where the evolving standards of
decency analysis comes into play within the two prongs and also what courts
are relying on in determining that a treatment does or does not meet this
standard. However, what is clear is that punishments that do not comport
with society’s standards of decency will be deemed cruel and unusual.81
C. Medical Needs Unique to Transgender Inmates
Transgender inmates with gender dysphoria, in particular, rely on the
Eighth Amendment when asserting their right to receive proper medical
evaluation and treatment.82 They argue that gender dysphoria is a serious
medical condition and that failure to provide transition-related
accommodations, such as clothes and grooming,83 hormone therapy,84 and
GCS, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.85 Although courts initially
denied these claims, today, courts recognize some duty on the part of the
prisons to treat gender dysphoria.86
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020) (discussing evolving standards of decency before beginning the twopronged analysis and then again in the conclusion); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96 (exploring
evolving standards of decency not in the context of the two prongs but in the conclusion of
the opinion).
78. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (stating that evolving standards of decency are the
backdrop against which Eighth Amendment claims must be considered).
79. See Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066–67 (9th Cir. 2014) (considering
evolving standards of decency in determining what constitutes a serious medical need);
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that sufficiently harmful
acts or omissions constitute deliberate indifference only when they offend evolving standards
of decency).
80. Rezabek, supra note 53, at 412.
81. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
82. See Halbach, supra note 59, at 474 (“[T]ransgender prisoners have turned to the
Eighth Amendment to argue that a deprivation of hormone therapy and [GCS] constitutes
cruel and unusual punishment.”).
83. See, e.g., Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2020).
84. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 555 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing plaintiffs’
allegation that the prison’s blanket ban on hormone treatment violated the Eighth
Amendment); De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 632 (4th Cir. 2003) (restating defendant’s
allegation that the prison’s failure to provide her with hormone therapy treatment constituted
cruel and unusual punishment).
85. See, e.g., Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 767 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020); Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 2019); Kosilek v. Spencer,
774 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2014).
86. See Rogers, supra note 25, at 195 (stating that courts have recognized that in at least
some circumstances, prisoners have a right to transition-related medical care).
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1. Gender Dysphoria
According to the American Psychiatric Association (APA), gender
dysphoria is a condition that involves an “incongruence between one’s
experienced/expressed gender and their assigned gender.”87 It is informally
described as the feeling of being “trapped in the wrong body.”88 Gender
dysphoria typically results in significant distress or impaired functioning.89
Patients experiencing gender dysphoria often exhibit “depression, anxiety,
compulsivity, behavior disorders, personality disorders, and tendencies
toward self-harm and suicide.”90 The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders provides criteria for diagnosing gender dysphoria.91 It
suggests that patients must exhibit at least two of the following characteristics
for at least six months to be diagnosed with gender dysphoria:
1.

A marked incongruence between one’s experienced/expressed gender
and primary and/or secondary sex characteristics (or in young
adolescents, the anticipated secondary sex characteristics).

2.

A strong desire to be rid of one’s primary and/or secondary sex
characteristics because of a marked incongruence with one’s
experienced/expressed gender (or in young adolescents, a desire to
prevent the development of the anticipated secondary sex
characteristics).

3.

A strong desire for the primary and/or secondary sex characteristics of
the other gender.

4.

A strong desire to be of the other gender (or some alternative gender
different from one’s assigned gender).

5.

A strong desire to be treated as the other gender (or some alternative
gender different from one’s assigned gender).

6.

A strong conviction that one has the typical feelings and reactions of
the other gender (or some alternative gender different from one’s
assigned gender).92

A wide range of treatments have been prescribed for gender dysphoria.93
These include counseling, hormone therapy, puberty suppression, and
GCS.94

87. Jack Turban, What Is Gender Dysphoria?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Nov. 2020),
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria
[https://perma.cc/QU58-4GM6].
88. See Susan S. Bendlin, Gender Dysphoria in the Jailhouse: A Constitutional Right to
Hormone Therapy, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 957, 960 (2013).
89. Turban, supra note 87.
90. Bourcicot & Woofter, supra note 19, at 286.
91. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 452 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5].
92. Id.
93. Turban, supra note 87.
94. Id.
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2. Gender Confirmation Surgery
GCS is a procedure that typically consists of breast/chest surgery, genital
surgery, and nongenital, nonbreast surgical interventions.95 Some gender
dysphoric inmates believe that GCS is the only adequate way to treat their
condition.96
The World Professional Association for Transgender Health (WPATH),
an international organization dedicated to advancing transgender health care,
agrees that for some patients with gender dysphoria, GCS is a medical
necessity.97 To “provide clinical guidance for health professionals to assist
transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming people,” the WPATH
created the Standards of Care for the Health of Transsexual, Transgender,
and Gender Nonconforming People (SOC).98 The SOC lays out the
following criteria for determining whether GCS is necessary:
1.

Persistent, well documented gender dysphoria;

2.

Capacity to make a fully informed decision and to consent for
treatment;

3.

Age of majority in a given country;

4.

If significant medical or mental health concerns are present, they must
be well controlled;

5.

12 continuous months of hormone therapy as appropriate to the
patient’s gender goals (unless the patient has a medical
contraindication or is otherwise unable or unwilling to take hormones).

6.

12 continuous months of living in a gender role that is congruent with
their gender identity.99

Although endorsed by WPATH, the necessity of GCS is not accepted by
everyone in the medical community.100 A “minority of the medical
community” refuses to accept that GCS is anything more than “cosmetic”

95. WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR TRANSGENDER HEALTH, STANDARDS OF CARE FOR THE
HEALTH OF TRANSSEXUAL, TRANSGENDER, AND GENDER NONCONFORMING PEOPLE 57 (7th ed.
2011) [hereinafter WPATH SOC], https://www.wpath.org/media/cms/Documents/SOC
%20v7/Standards%20of%20Care%20V7%20-%202011%20WPATH.pdf?_t=1605186324
[https://perma.cc/N3QQ-CRJR].
96. See Rena Lindevaldsen, A State’s Obligation to Fund Hormonal Therapy and SexReassignment Surgery for Prisoners Diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder, 7 LIBERTY U.
L. REV. 15, 15 (2012) (stating that some patients with gender dysphoria believe their condition
will only be alleviated through surgery).
97. WPATH SOC, supra note 95, at 1, 54.
98. Id. at 1.
99. Id. at 60.
100. See Brooke Acevedo, Note, The Constitutionality and Future of Sex Reassignment
Surgery in United States Prisons, 28 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 81, 88 (2017).
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surgery.101 These individuals reject the conclusions and authority of
WPATH and believe that the SOC are merely “guidelines.”102
II. THE DISPUTE OVER GENDER CONFIRMATION SURGERY BEGINS IN THE
FIRST CIRCUIT
In Kosilek, a circuit court addressed for the first time whether, under the
Eighth Amendment, a prison’s failure to provide GCS to a transgender
inmate amounted to cruel and unusual punishment.103 Part II.A explores the
merits of Kosilek’s Eighth Amendment claim. Specifically, this section
discusses the court’s holding that the prison was not deliberately indifferent
to Kosilek’s serious medical need and provided her with adequate health
care. Part II.B highlights Kosilek’s influence in the split between the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS.
A. Kosilek v. Spencer
Michelle Kosilek, a prisoner assigned male at birth, had experienced
gender dysphoria since the age of three.104 As a result of her gender identity,
she endured tremendous mental and physical abuse throughout her life.105 In
1992, Kosilek was sentenced to life without parole for first-degree murder of
her then wife.106 While in prison, Kosilek attempted suicide twice.107 She
also tied a string around her testicles to castrate herself.108
Kosilek filed multiple lawsuits against the Massachusetts Department of
Correction (MDOC).109 In her first suit, she alleged that the prison’s failure
to evaluate her for gender dysphoria and provide the requisite treatment
amounted to cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.110
The district court held that the health care provided was inadequate but that
the prison was not deliberately indifferent.111 To rectify this inadequacy, the
prison provided Kosilek with hormones, electrolysis, feminine clothes,
accessories, and therapy to alleviate her dysphoria.112 Kosilek still sought
101. See id. (first citing Melissa Pandika, A Case Against Sex Change Surgeries, OZY (Nov.
10,
2015),
https://www.ozy.com/the-new-and-the-next/a-case-against-sex-changesurgeries/39103 [https://perma.cc/9N9W-75NN]; and then citing Julie Bindel, The Operation
That Can Ruin Your Life, STANDPOINT (Oct. 19, 2009), https://standpointmag.co.uk/theoperation-that-can-ruin-your-life-features-november-09-julie-bindel-transsexuals/
[https://perma.cc/T3FU-YCNU]).
102. See, e.g., Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 76 (1st Cir. 2014) (discussing the testimony
of a licensed psychiatrist and an associate director of the John Hopkins School of Medicine
who stated that WPATH’s SOC are just guidelines rejected by many people involved in the
gender dysphoria field).
103. Id. at 68.
104. Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 158 (D. Mass. 2002).
105. Id.
106. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68–69.
107. Id. at 69.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 68.
110. See Kosilek, 221 F. Supp. 2d at 159.
111. Id. at 195.
112. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 89.
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GCS, but the prison denied her request.113 She filed a second suit alleging
that failure to provide GCS specifically amounted to inadequate medical care
for her gender dysphoria under the Eighth Amendment.114 After over twenty
years of litigation, in 2012, the district court issued an injunction ordering
MDOC to provide Kosilek with GCS.115 In 2014, the issue reached the First
Circuit.116 The First Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of injunctive
relief and held that MDOC’s failure to provide Kosilek with GCS was
constitutional.117
First, according to the court, Kosilek failed to satisfy the objective prong
of her inadequate medical care claim.118 The court accepted that Kosilek’s
gender dysphoria constituted a serious medical need.119 This was undisputed
by the state.120 However, the court held that the prison’s treatment was
adequate.121 In particular, the court found that GCS was not medically
necessary to treat Kosilek’s dysphoria.122 The court noted that the prison’s
treatment led to a “real and marked improvement in Kosilek’s mental
state.”123 Kosilek’s doctors testified that since receiving such treatment, she
was joyful and more stable.124 Kosilek even admitted that MDOC’s
treatment “led to a significant stabilization in her mental state.”125
Importantly, the court also acknowledged that a long period of time had
passed since she had had suicidal ideation or attempted to castrate herself.126
The court determined that this treatment resulted in “significant” physical
changes and an “increasingly feminine appearance.”127 Additionally, the
court noted that MDOC even had a plan in place to minimize the risk of future
harm to Kosilek.128
Moreover, the court found that the district court erroneously discredited a
doctor’s testimony that GCS was not medically necessary for Kosilek.129
Although the doctor did not rely on WPATH’s SOC in determining that GCS
was not necessary, the court nevertheless found the doctor’s testimony to be
113. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 889 F. Supp. 2d 190, 197 (D. Mass. 2012), rev’d, 774 F.3d
63.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 68.
117. See id. at 96.
118. See id. at 90.
119. Id. at 86.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 86 (stating that the prison’s treatment “far exceeds a level of care that is ‘so
inadequate as to shock the conscience’” (quoting Torraco v. Maloney, 923 F.2d 231, 235 (1st
Cir. 1991))).
122. See id. at 90 (stating that the prison chose one of two acceptable alternative
treatments).
123. Id. at 89.
124. Id. at 90.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 86–87. According to the First Circuit, the district court ignored “critical nuance”
in the doctor’s testimony and relied on a “severely strained reading.” Id. at 87.
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credible.130 The court highlighted the testimony that indicated that the SOC
were flexible and a product of the “lack of rigorous research in the field.”131
The majority specifically noted that, at the time, the SOC included language
that said, “all readers should be aware of the limitations of knowledge in this
area.”132
The court also determined that the subjective prong was not fulfilled.133
The court reasoned that MDOC neither knew nor should have known that
GCS was the only adequate treatment.134 The court noted that MDOC
received the opinions of multiple medical professionals and was ultimately
presented with two seemingly alternative treatment plans, one that included
GCS and one that did not.135
Further, the court found that MDOC was not deliberately indifferent given
the safety concerns present in this case.136 Specifically, the court noted the
threat to safety that arises when housing a transgender female inmate “with
a criminal history of extreme violence against a female domestic partner—
within a female prison population containing high numbers of domestic
violence survivors.”137 The court also cited the testimony of multiple prison
officials who acknowledged the risk, on the other hand, of housing a
transgender female prisoner in a facility for male prisoners.138 Lastly,
although Kosilek’s suicidal ideation was “very real,” the court found credible
MDOC’s concern that providing Kosilek with GCS could incentivize other
inmates to threaten suicide to receive a desired treatment.139
In reaching its holding, the court recognized that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishments that violate society’s standards of decency.140
However, the court did not look to any objective indicia of a national

130. Id.
131. See id. at 78, 87.
132. Id. at 87. However, such language has since been removed from WPATH’s SOC. See
WPATH SOC, supra note 95.
133. Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 91 (explaining that even if GCS was necessary, “it is not the
district court’s own belief about medical necessity that controls, but what was known and
understood by prison officials in crafting their policy” (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
300 (1991))).
134. Id. at 91–92.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 92 (stating that, with issues of security, the policy decisions of prison officials
“should be accorded wide-ranging deference” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547
(1979))).
137. Id. at 93.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 94.
140. Id. at 96 (“The Eighth Amendment, after all, proscribes only medical care so
unconscionable as to fall below society’s minimum standards of decency.” (citing Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102–05 (1976))).
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consensus, as is typically done in other Eighth Amendment cases.141 Instead,
Kosilek relied solely on the expert testimony presented in the case.142
B. The Significance of Kosilek
The holding of Kosilek was clear: Kosilek failed to satisfy both the
objective and subjective prong of her Eighth Amendment inadequate health
care claim.143 Thus, denying GCS was not cruel and unusual punishment.144
However, the implications of this holding are ambiguous. Some courts have
understood Kosilek to stand for the proposition that a blanket ban on GCS is
constitutional, as GCS is never medically necessary.145 Others have
interpreted Kosilek as merely conducting a fact-specific analysis and
determining that GCS was not medically necessary in that particular case.146
Given this disagreement, as a circuit split developed among the Ninth and
Fifth Circuits regarding the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS, courts
on both sides of the debate have relied on Kosilek to support their holdings.147
III. THE FIFTH AND NINTH CIRCUITS WEIGH IN AND SPLIT
After Kosilek, a split emerged among the circuit courts as to the
constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS.148 While courts have uniformly
accepted that gender dysphoria constitutes a serious medical need,149 a

141. See Rezabek, supra note 53, at 403–05 (discussing Kosilek and stating that “although
courts purport to analyze punishment, medical care, and prison condition cases according to
‘evolving standards of decency,’ which requires an examination of ‘objective indicia of a
society’s standards,’ courts seem to largely ignore objective considerations in medical care
cases”).
142. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86–90 (reviewing the expert testimony before determining
that “DOC [had] chosen one of two alternatives—both of which [were] reasonably
commensurate with the medical standards of prudent professionals”).
143. See supra Part II.A.
144. See Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 96.
145. See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 224–25 (5th Cir. 2019); Armstrong v. Mid-Level
Prac. John B. Connally Unit, No. SA-18-CV-00677, 2020 WL 230887, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Jan.
15, 2020).
146. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 794 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020); Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1191 (N.D Cal. 2015).
147. See, e.g., Edmo, 935 F.3d at 794 (citing Kosilek in support of its fact-specific analysis
and rejection of a blanket ban on GCS); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 224–25 (relying on Kosilek to
hold that a blanket ban on GCS is constitutional).
148. Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 796–97 (finding a blanket ban to be unconstitutional),
with Gibson, 920 F.3d at 216 (accepting a blanket ban as within the bounds of the Eighth
Amendment).
149. See Alvin Lee, Note, Trans Models in Prison: The Medicalization of Gender Identity
and the Eighth Amendment Right to Sex Reassignment Therapy, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 447,
464 (2008); see also Edmo, 935 F.3d at 785 (acknowledging that many courts have recognized
gender dysphoria as a serious medical need); Gibson, 920 F.3d at 219 (stating that the state
does not contest that the plaintiff diagnosed with gender dysphoria has a serious medical
need); Kosilek, 774 F.3d at 86 (“That [gender dysphoria] is a serious medical need . . . is not
in dispute in this case.”).
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conflict centers around the necessity of GCS.150 Part III.A of this Note
examines Gibson, in which the Fifth Circuit held that a blanket ban on GCS
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment because GCS is never
medically necessary. Part III.B of this Note explores the contrary approach
adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Edmo and its conclusion that GCS is
medically necessary in certain circumstances.
A. The Fifth Circuit: Gibson
After Kosilek, the Fifth Circuit in Gibson addressed whether it was cruel
and unusual punishment to deny a transgender prisoner GCS.151 Vanessa
Lynn Gibson, the plaintiff, was a transgender female inmate in the custody
of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ).152 Gibson, who had
been diagnosed with gender dysphoria, had identified as female since age
fifteen.153 While imprisoned for aggravated robbery, Gibson suffered from
depression and “acute distress.”154 She tried to castrate herself and attempted
suicide three times.155 The prison provided Gibson hormone therapy and
counseling to treat her dysphoria.156 However, she claimed this treatment
did not alleviate her distress and that without GCS, she would again attempt
to commit suicide or self-castration.157 The prison denied her repeated
requests for GCS, as the prison’s policy explicitly prohibited the use of GCS
to treat gender dysphoria.158 Gibson filed suit against the director of TDCJ,
arguing that the blanket ban on GCS amounted to deliberate indifference
because it prevented the prison from even considering whether GCS was
necessary for her.159 The Fifth Circuit rejected Gibson’s claim and upheld
the constitutionality of a blanket ban on GCS.160
1. The Objective Prong
The court held that Gibson satisfied the objective prong of her Eighth
Amendment claim.161 Gibson’s gender dysphoria constituted a serious
medical need as reflected by her “record of psychological distress, suicidal
ideation, and threats of self-harm.”162 The court never explicitly addressed
the adequacy of Gibson’s treatment.163 However, the court viewed the
150. Compare Edmo, 935 F.3d at 787 (stating that GCS can be medically necessary), with
Gibson, 920 F.3d at 220–21 (finding that GCS is never medically necessary).
151. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 215.
152. Id. at 216–17.
153. Id. at 217.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 217–18.
159. Id. at 218.
160. See id. at 226.
161. See id. at 219.
162. Id.
163. See id. (stating only that Gibson had a serious medical need before proceeding to the
subjective prong of the analysis).
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subjective prong, namely the prison’s alleged deliberate indifference, as the
only real issue in dispute.164
2. The Subjective Prong
The court held that Gibson’s Eighth Amendment claim failed to satisfy the
subjective prong.165 The state did not act with deliberate indifference by
implementing a blanket ban on GCS.166 In so holding, the court reasoned
that “there is no intentional or wanton deprivation of care” when a prison
denies an inmate a treatment that is highly contested within the medical
community.167 According to the court, unless a treatment is “universally
accepted” by the medical community as necessary, failure to provide such
treatment cannot amount to deliberate indifference.168 Because the court
found that GCS was not universally accepted, it concluded a blanket ban on
the surgery did not violate the Eighth Amendment.169
The court relied exclusively on the record in Kosilek to determine that GCS
was not “universally accepted” as medically necessary.170 First, the Fifth
Circuit rejected the acceptance of the WPATH’s SOC, which assert that GCS
is a medical necessity.171 According to the court, the testimony in Kosilek
demonstrated that the SOC “reflect not consensus, but merely one side in a
sharply contested medical debate over [GCS].”172 Moreover, the court found
that the record in Kosilek “document[ed] more than enough dissension within
the medical community” to prove that GCS was not medically necessary.173
As the court found that GCS is never required, it had no impetus to address
Gibson’s individualized need and instead upheld the blanket ban. 174
Further, the court determined that blanket bans in and of themselves do not
amount to deliberate indifference.175 In upholding the blanket ban, the court
relied on both the Constitution and precedent.176 The court argued that the
164. See id.
165. See id. at 220.
166. See id. at 224–25.
167. Id. at 220 (citing Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 2019)).
168. See id. at 220–21.
169. See id. at 224.
170. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (stating
that Gibson “coopted the record from Kosilek” in finding that GCS is never medically
necessary), reh’g denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of
Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 191280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020).
171. See Gibson, 920 F.3d at 223 (stating that WPATH’s SOC do not reflect a medical
consensus).
172. Id. at 221–22 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting
specifically that the testimonies of Dr. Chester Schmidt, a licensed psychiatrist and associate
director of Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and Dr. Stephen Levine, an author of
WPATH’s SOC, expressed skepticism about the efficacy of the SOC and acknowledged that
many medical professionals decline to adhere to them).
173. See id. at 223.
174. See id. at 223–25.
175. See id. at 224–25.
176. See id. at 225.
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Eighth Amendment permits categorical judgments in certain contexts.177
Additionally, the court relied on Kosilek as precedent for condoning a blanket
ban, noting that both the Kosilek dissent and Gibson’s counsel “construed the
logic” of the majority to allow for such a ban.178
3. Evolving Standards of Decency
Gibson recognized the importance of considering evolving standards of
decency when determining which punishments are cruel and unusual.179 Not
only did the court cite numerous Supreme Court opinions to demonstrate this
significance180 but it also specifically stated that “our job is to identify the
‘evolving standards of decency’; to determine, not what they should be, but
what they are.”181 In espousing that evolving standards of decency do not
reflect a national consensus regarding the necessity of GCS, the court noted
that only one state at the time had ever provided GCS to an inmate.182 Thus,
denying such surgery could not be “unusual” or outside the bounds of
decency.183
B. The Ninth Circuit: Edmo
Faced with a transgender prisoner’s Eighth Amendment inadequate health
care claim, the Ninth Circuit in Edmo rejected the blanket ban on GCS
adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Gibson.184 Adree Edmo, the plaintiff, was a
transgender female prisoner in the custody of the Idaho Department of
Correction (IDOC).185 She had identified as female since the age of five or
six.186 Edmo was officially diagnosed with gender dysphoria after her arrest
for sexual abuse of a fifteen-year-old male.187 While incarcerated, Edmo
legally changed her name to Adree and the sex on her birth certificate to
177. See id. The court illustrated this point by reference to the FDA. Id. The court
explained that the Eighth Amendment does not require an individualized assessment of an
inmate’s need for a certain drug where the FDA has categorically banned such drug. See id.
178. See id. at 224–25 (citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 106–07 (1st Cir. 2014)
(Thompson J., dissenting)).
179. See id. at 226–27 (explaining that the “fundamental flaw” in Gibson’s argument is that
this punishment comports with evolving standards of decency) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989))).
180. See id. at 227 (first citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976 (1991); then citing
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. at 361, 378 (1989); then citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 564 (2005); and then Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 938–39 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
181. Id. (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (2015)).
182. Id. (citing Quine v. Beard, No. 14-cv-02726, 2017 WL 1540758, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr.
28, 2017)).
183. See id. at 228.
184. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“We
respectfully disagree with the categorical nature of our sister circuit’s holding.”), reh’g denied,
949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct.
2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 2020).
185. Id. at 767.
186. Id. at 772.
187. Id.
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female.188 She also consistently “presented” herself as female through her
hairstyle and makeup.189 The prison provided Edmo with hormone
therapy.190 Edmo gained the maximum physical changes associated with this
treatment.191 However, she continued to experience “significant distress”
due to her genitalia.192 She specifically stated she felt depressed,
embarrassed, and disgusted by it.193 While receiving hormone treatment,
Edmo attempted to castrate herself twice.194 She also cut her arms with razor
blades to help alleviate “the ‘emotional torment’ and mental anguish her
gender dysphoria cause[d] her.”195 Edmo sought GCS, but the prison denied
her requests.196 Although IDOC’s policy permitted GCS when determined
necessary by the treating physician, it was deemed unnecessary for Edmo.197
Edmo filed suit, alleging that IDOC was deliberately indifferent to her
gender dysphoria by denying GCS.198 Specifically, she sought an injunction
ordering the prison to perform such surgery.199 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court’s grant of an injunction, holding that GCS was medically
necessary to treat Edmo’s dysphoria.200 In so holding, the court rejected the
blanket ban approach endorsed by Gibson and employed a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether the denial of GCS amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment.201 The Supreme Court denied the state’s application
for a stay of the injunction pending appeal202 and Edmo received her surgery
on July 10, 2020.203

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 773–74.
195. Id. at 774.
196. Id. at 773.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 775.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 767.
201. See id. at 794, 797 (holding that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence requires a “factspecific analysis” rather than a de facto ban on GCS).
202. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140 S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), cert
denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 60337411 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2020).
203. Tommy Simmons, Idaho Transgender Inmate Becomes 2nd in Country to Receive
Gender Confirmation Surgery, IDAHO PRESS (July 27, 2020), https://www.idahopress.
com/news/local/idaho-transgender-inmate-becomes-2nd-in-country-to-receive-genderconfirmation-surgery/article_f2aad619-2735-5040-8904-2a762f0734e9.html
[https://perma.cc/FJZ3-3HXC].
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1. The Objective Prong
The court found that Edmo satisfied the objective prong.204 Edmo’s
gender dysphoria constituted “a sufficiently serious medical need.”205 The
court recognized that gender dysphoria is a serious medical condition,206
which caused Edmo to attempt self-castration and “to feel ‘depressed,’
‘disgusting,’ ‘tormented,’ and ‘hopeless.’”207
The court also found that the prison’s treatment was inadequate under the
Eighth Amendment.208 In particular, the court held that GCS was necessary
in this specific case.209 In reaching this conclusion, the court gave weight to
Edmo’s experts, who explained the necessity of GCS.210 According to the
court, Edmo’s experts were well qualified, “logically and persuasively”
stated their opinions, and correctly applied WPATH’s SOC.211 On the other
hand, the state’s experts, who argued that GCS was not necessary, lacked
expertise in treating people with gender dysphoria, and either incorrectly
applied WPATH’s SOC or failed to do so at all.212
2. The Subjective Prong
Further, the court concluded that Edmo’s claim satisfied the subjective
prong, as the prison facility consciously disregarded an excessive risk to
Edmo’s health.213 The court found that the prison’s psychiatrist “acted with
The
deliberate indifference to Edmo’s serious medical needs.”214
psychiatrist knew that even with hormone treatment, Edmo had attempted to
castrate herself twice, that Edmo suffered gender dysphoria and “clinically
significant” distress, and that Edmo’s gender dysphoria, in the pyschiatrist’s
words, “had risen to another level.”215 Yet, despite this knowledge, the
prison psychiatrist never reevaluated or recommended a change in Edmo’s
treatment plan.216

204. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767 (stating that Edmo had a serious medical need and that the
treatment provided by the prison was inadequate).
205. Id. at 785 (first citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039–40 (9th Cir. 2015);
then citing Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 86 (1st Cir. 2014); then citing De’lonta v.
Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013); then citing Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 452
(1st Cir. 2011); then citing Allard v. Gomez, 9 F. App’x 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); then citing
White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325 (8th Cir. 1988); then citing Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821
F.2d 408, 412 (7th Cir. 1987); then citing Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1164, 1187
(N.D. Cal. 2015); and then citing Konitzer v. Frank, 711 F. Supp. 2d 874, 905 (E.D. Wis.
2010)).
206. Id. (citing DSM-5, supra note 91, at 453, 458).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 786.
209. Id. at 787.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 792–93.
214. Id. at 793.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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3. Evolving Standards of Decency
Although the court never explicitly undertook an evolving standards of
decency analysis, that principle implicitly underlies its holding.217 The court
acknowledged the important role that evolving standards of decency play in
an Eighth Amendment analysis.218 The language used by the court in its
conclusion also reflects consideration of such a standard.219 The court stated
that the “increased social awareness” of transgender health care underlay the
court’s rejection of a blanket ban on GCS.220 The court further noted that
this holding comports with new results in medical research, the heightened
experience of the medical community in dealing with individuals with gender
dysphoria, and changes in the medical community’s understanding of which
treatments are safe and effective to treat gender dysphoria.221
4. Rejection of Gibson
The Ninth Circuit rejected the blanket ban adopted in Gibson.222 The court
noted that contrary to Gibson, there is medical consensus that GCS is
effective and medically necessary in certain situations.223 Unlike Gibson, the
court found that the SOC, which state that GCS can be necessary, are
accepted by the medical community, as they have been endorsed by
numerous prominent medical associations across the country.224 The court
recognized that most courts also accept the SOC as the appropriate means to
treat transgender patients.225 Additionally, every expert in Edmo agreed that
GCS can be medically necessary in certain situations, and the state did not
dispute this contention.226 The court also rejected Gibson’s view that Kosilek
stands for the proposition that GCS is never medically necessary.227 The
court determined that the only suggestion in Kosilek that GCS is never
medically necessary came from the testimony of Dr. Cynthia Osborne.228
However, Dr. Osborne changed her view ten years after her testimony and

217. See id. at 803 (discussing how the holding comports with contemporary standards of
transgender health care).
218. See id. at 797 n.21 (stating that evolving standards of decency are “enshrined” in the
Eighth Amendment).
219. See id. at 803.
220. See id.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 795–96 (rejecting the categorical nature of Gibson’s decision).
223. Id. at 795.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 769; see also, e.g, Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1298
(11th Cir. 2020); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 522–23 (4th Cir. 2013); Soneeya v.
Spencer, 851 F. Supp. 2d 228, 231–32 (D. Mass. 2012).
226. See Edmo, 935 F.3d at 767.
227. Id. at 795.
228. Id.
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had since concluded that GCS “can be medically necessary for some . . .
including some prison inmates.”229
Edmo found that Kosilek did not pave the way for a blanket ban on GCS.230
Instead, the court reasoned that the Ninth Circuit simply “assess[ed] whether
the record before it demonstrated deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s
gender dysphoria” by employing a case-by-case analysis approach.231 The
court emphasized that Kosilek itself specifically stated that its opinion should
not be read to create a blanket ban on GCS, as “any such policy would
conflict with the requirement that medical care be individualized based on a
particular prisoner’s serious medical needs.”232 Although the Edmo and
Kosilek courts reached opposite outcomes, the Ninth Circuit in Edmo
reconciled the two cases by noting the factual differences.233
Lastly, the court found that a blanket ban stands in opposition to existing
Eighth Amendment precedent.234 According to the court, Gibson’s holding
was contrary to “settled” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which requires
a fact-specific analysis of the record in each case.235 The Ninth Circuit also
noted that Gibson conflicted with the “decisions of this circuit, the Fourth
Circuit, and the Seventh Circuit, all of which have held that denying surgical
treatment for gender dysphoria can pose a cognizable Eighth Amendment
claim.”236
IV. CONFORMING TO THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH
The constitutionality of a prison’s failure to provide GCS should be
assessed on a case-by-case basis. Courts should look to the specific facts of
a case to determine whether, under the objective prong, the treatment
provided was adequate and whether, under the subjective prong, the prison
acted with deliberate indifference. This necessitates a rejection of the blanket
ban upheld in Gibson. Part IV.A lays out the reasons why the case-by-case
approach of Edmo should be implemented. Part IV.B then suggests specific
factors courts should consider when applying this approach.
229. Id. at 796 (quoting Cynthia S. Osborne & Anne A. Lawrence, Male Prison Inmates
with Gender Dysphoria: When Is Sex Reassignment Surgery Appropriate?, 45 ARCHIVES OF
SEXUAL BEHAV. 1649, 1651 (2016)).
230. Id. at 797.
231. Id.
232. Id. (quoting Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014)).
233. Id. at 794. First, the court noted that there are no security concerns present, as there
were in Kosilek. Id. Second, and most importantly, qualified medical experts disagreed about
the necessity of GCS in Kosilek. Id. However, the court reasoned that no such disagreement
occurred in Edmo. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. (first citing Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 975 (9th Cir. 2011); then citing
Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 2016); then citing Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491
F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2007); then citing Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011);
then citing Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010); and then citing Chance
v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998)).
236. Id. at 796 (first citing Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1040 (9th Cir. 2015); then
citing Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 552–53, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011); and then citing De’lonta
v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013)).
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A. Courts Should Employ a Case-by-Case Analysis
A blanket ban on a medical treatment is contrary to existing Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence. Additionally, in the context of GCS, blanket
bans are contrary to evolving standards of decency and conflict with the
consensus among the medical community that GCS can be medically
necessary. Moreover, Gibson, the only authority in support of blanket bans
on GCS, is riddled with flaws. It is for these reasons that courts must discard
the categorical ban on GCS accepted by the Fifth Circuit in Gibson and
instead adopt the approach of Edmo.
1. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence Rejects Blanket Bans
With the exception of the Fifth Circuit in Gibson, every circuit has asserted
the necessity of a fact-specific inquiry in assessing a prisoner’s inadequate
medical care claim.237 The majority of courts have held that a blanket policy
prohibiting a certain medical treatment violates the Eight Amendment, as it
“does not allow for the consideration of an inmate’s particular medical
needs.”238 The case law overwhelmingly demonstrates that a blanket ban is
impermissible under the Eighth Amendment, and Gibson did not cite a single
case to refute this contention. Therefore, Gibson is merely an outlier.
2. Blanket Bans on GCS Are Inconsistent with Evolving Standards of
Decency
Evaluating a society’s “standard of decency” requires an analysis of
“objective indicia.”239 Kosilek, Gibson, and Edmo all recognized the
importance of evolving standards of decency in determining cruel and
unusual punishments.240 Yet, surprisingly, none of these courts adequately
looked to objective indicia to determine society’s standards regarding

237. See id. at 796–97 (rejecting a blanket ban analysis); Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390,
394 (10th Cir. 2016) (stating that a deliberate indifference inquiry is “fact-intensive” (citing
Hartsfield v. Colburn, 491 F.3d at 394, 397 (8th Cir. 2017))); Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d
63, 91 (1st Cir. 2014) (explaining that blanket policies would conflict with the Eighth
Amendment’s requirement for individualized medical care); De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d
520, 526 (4th Cir. 2013) (finding that categorically denying evaluation for GCS establishes an
Eight Amendment claim); Roe Elyea, 631 F.3d 843, 859 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[I]nmate medical
care decisions must be fact-based.”); Youmans Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 564 (11th Cir. 2010)
(stating that deliberate indifference claims are very fact specific); Chance v. Armstrong, 143
F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“Whether a course of treatment was the product of sound
medical judgment, negligence, or deliberate indifference depends on the facts of the case.”);
Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding
that a blanket policy denying elective abortions “denies to a class of inmates the type of
individualized treatment normally associated with the provision of adequate medical care”).
238. Fisher v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 484 F. Supp. 3d 521, 543 (N.D. Ohio 2020); see,
e.g., Roe, 631 F.3d at 860 (stressing the necessity of individualized treatment under the Eighth
Amendment).
239. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of objective
indicia in assessing Eighth Amendment claims).
240. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.3, III.B.3.
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GCS.241 Just like other Eighth Amendment cases, courts facing inadequate
medical care claims should consider objective indicia of society’s standards
regarding a treatment. In the medical care context, this means considering
factors such as whether the treatment is covered under programs like
Medicaid or Medicare, whether laws facilitate or discourage people from
undergoing such treatment, how accessible the treatment is, and current
trends in the law regarding the particular treatment.242
Objective indicia point toward a national consensus that categorically
denying GCS would be cruel and unusual punishment. First, GCS is now
frequently covered under public and private health care plans.243 Medicaid
plans in only ten states explicitly exclude GCS from coverage.244 Moreover,
Medicare no longer excludes transition-related health care, including
GCS.245 Instead, as with most other medical treatments, Medicare
determines whether GCS should be covered on a case-by-case basis.246
Additionally, more and more employers are offering health insurance plans
that cover transition-related medical treatment.247 This includes government
entities, Fortune 500 companies, nonprofits, and small firms.248 In fact,
many public and private universities now cover transition-related medical
treatments for students.249
Second, most federal and state laws no longer discourage patients from
seeking GCS.250 Although some state legislatures are trying to prevent
minors from undergoing GCS, no state law currently prohibits surgeons from
performing such surgeries on adults.251

241. See supra Parts II.A, III.A.3, III.B.3.
242. See Rezabek, supra note 53, at 399, 412–13 (listing these factors as reliable indicators
of a national consensus favoring or disfavoring a treatment).
243. Laura Joszt, Gender-Affirming Surgeries Increasingly Covered by Private Insurance,
Medicare, Medicaid, AM. J. OF MANAGED CARE (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/view
/genderaffirming-surgeries-increasingly-covered-by-private-insurance-medicare-medicaid
[https://perma.cc/N4HB-H5X7].
244. Equality Maps: Healthcare Laws and Policies, MOVEMENT ADVANCEMENT PROJECT,
lgbtmap.org/equality-maps/healthcare_laws_and_policies
[https://perma.cc/NTF3-JGGH]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2021).
245. Know Your Rights:
Medicare, NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL.,
https://transequality.org/know-your-rights/medicare [https://perma.cc/QT7C-V7TQ] (last
visited Apr. 14, 2021).
246. Id.
247. ACLU, TRANSGENDER PEOPLE AND THE LAW: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 14
(2019), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_pdf_file/lgbttransbrochurelaw2015
electronic.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE3X-CAJP] (stating that hundreds of employers are now
offering plans to cover transition-related treatments).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. See Know Your Rights: Medicare, supra note 245 (explaining that federal and state
laws prohibit health insurance plans from refusing to cover transition-related care, such as
GCS).
251. Scottie Andrews, This Year, at Least Six Sates Are Trying to Restrict Transgender
Kids from Getting Gender Reassignment Treatments, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 22, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/22/politics/transgender-healthcare-laws-minorstrnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/U2ND-NWS9].
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Third, the practical barriers to receiving the surgery have decreased.
Whereas, in the past, many individuals seeking GCS had to travel out of state
or even out of the country,252 GCS is now dramatically more accessible in
the United States.253 Between 2015 and 2016 alone, there was a 20 percent
increase in the number of these surgeries performed in the United States.254
As of 2019, GCS was performed with such frequency that it accounted for
revenue of over $184.6 million.255 Not only are surgeries more readily
available but medical professionals are also more educated and trained
regarding GCS.256
Further, recent legal trends support a national consensus favoring GCS. At
the time of Kosilek and Gibson, GCS for prison inmates was
“unprecedented.”257 Only one state—California—had ever provided the
surgery to an inmate.258 This is no longer the case.259 As of July 2020, an
Idaho prison facility provided GCS to Adree Edmo.260 Even more indicative
of the legal trend favoring GCS was the Supreme Court’s refusal to stay
Edmo’s injunction pending a decision on the petition for writ of certiorari in
that case.261 The Supreme Court’s decision allowed Edmo’s surgery to go
forward, making the lawsuit moot.262
Lastly, in determining which punishments are cruel and unusual, society’s
standards must be viewed in light of the national landscape.263 Today, more
than ever, there is a heightened awareness of the inequalities faced by
marginalized groups and a fervent desire to protect them. In the wake of
movements such as Black Lives Matter, there has been a “seismic shift in the
country” toward civil rights advocacy.264 This shift can be seen beyond just
the context of racial equality. It is also evident through the Supreme Court’s
decision in Bostock v. Clayton County,265 which marked a step toward greater

252. Rezabek, supra note 53, at 418.
253. Alexandra Sifferlin, Gender Confirmation Surgery Is on the Rise in the U.S., TIME
(May 22, 2017, 9:43 AM), https://time.com/4787914/transgender-gender-confirmationsurgery/ [https://perma.cc/7AZY-ALRX].
254. Id.
255. Michael Cook, The World Market for Sex Reassignment Is Growing, BIOEDGE (June
7, 2020), https://www.bioedge.org/mobile/view/the-world-market-for-sex-reassignmentsurgery-is-growing/13458 [https://perma.cc/PPS3-MT86].
256. See Sifferlin, supra note 253.
257. See Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212, 228 (5th Cir. 2019).
258. Id. at 227.
259. See Simmons, supra note 203.
260. Id.
261. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
262. See supra note 203 and accompanying text; see also Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo,
141 S. Ct. 610 (2020) (denying a petition for writ of certiorari after Edmo’s surgery).
263. See supra notes 48–53 and accompanying text (explaining how the Eighth
Amendment and what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment are shaped by society’s
contemporary values).
264. See Giovanni Russonello, Why Most Americans Support the Protest, N.Y. TIMES (June
5, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/05/us/politics/polling-george-floyd-protestsracism.html [https://perma.cc/638U-G9S6].
265. 140 S. Ct 1731 (2020).
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equality for transgender individuals.266 Transgender inmates are among such
marginalized groups in need of protection.
3. The Holding in Gibson Is Fatally Flawed
First, Gibson misinterpreted Kosilek, the case it purported to follow.
Kosilek did not promote a blanket ban on GCS.267 Instead, Kosilek explicitly
stated that its holding should not be read to preclude future inmates from
receiving GCS.268 Kosilek simply performed a case-specific analysis of the
facts on the record and determined that GCS was not medically necessary in
that specific instance.269 The court’s holding relied heavily on language such
as “on the record presented,” “in this case,” and “on these facts,” which are
all inconsistent with a categorical ban.270 The court even spelled out the facts
that doomed Kosilek’s claim.271 In stating that “this case presents unique
circumstances,” the court pointed to Kosilek’s specific criminal history, the
unique safety concerns at play, and the inconsistent expert opinions regarding
the necessity of GCS for Kosilek.272
Second, Gibson applied the wrong standard in determining whether GCS
was medically necessary. Gibson argued that a treatment can only be
necessary if it is “universally accepted” by the medical community.273
However, there is no support, within case law or in the Constitution, for the
contention that “universal acceptance” is required.274 In fact, the court in
Gibson did not cite a single authority to support this claim.275
Further, the consequences of requiring this heightened standard are
damaging. The medical community is constantly evolving. New drugs and
procedures are continuously being explored and prescribed. A universal
acceptance standard allows prisons to continue to offer “outdated medical
treatment plans” without adapting to changes in the medical community.276
Additionally, such a standard allows for discrimination against transgender
individuals. Under this standard, just a few biased opinions from doctors in
the medical community could render GCS medically unnecessary for Eighth
Amendment purposes even if the majority of doctors support it.277 Further,
266. Id. at 1753 (holding that employers are unable to discriminate against employees on
the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status).
267. See supra Part III.B.4.
268. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
270. See Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63, 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2014).
271. See id. at 91.
272. See id.
273. See supra notes 168–69 and accompanying text.
274. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19–20, Gibson v. Collier, 920 F.3d 212 (5th Cir.
2019) (No. 18-1586), 2019 WL 2711440, at *19–20 (stating that, in Atkins v. Virginia, 536
U.S. 304 (2002), for example, the Court determined there was a consensus against execution
of the intellectually disabled although there was “nearly evenly split state legislative actions”).
275. Id. at 19.
276. See Braver, supra note 18, at 2260.
277. See id. (discussing how the universal acceptance standard could allow the “stigma
surrounding the transgender community” to be “improperly imputed into medical
considerations”).
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universal acceptance is impractical and, ultimately, impossible.278 Even with
less controversial procedures, there are always doctors who have varying
opinions on how to treat a patient.
Lastly, Gibson erroneously relied on the expert testimony in Kosilek to
determine that GCS is never medically necessary. Kosilek was decided five
years before Gibson, and the experts in Kosilek were opining on the
consensus of GCS at the time the testimony was presented nearly thirteen
years earlier.279 But the court in Gibson failed to consider that in terms of
GCS’s acceptance, much had changed in those twenty years.280 At the time
of Kosilek, most health care plans did not cover the surgery, most legislation
precluded individuals from receiving GCS, and the surgery was largely
inaccessible to individuals in the United States.281 Moreover, even the state’s
main expert, Dr. Osborne, changed her opinion about the necessity of GCS
during that period.282 By relying on outdated testimony to conclude that GCS
was not medically necessary, Gibson failed to account for all the changes that
occurred between Gibson and Kosilek.283 This surely could not be the type
of analysis our founders expected to comport with evolving standards of
decency.
4. Consensus Among the Medical Community That GCS Can Be
Necessary
When a treatment is medically necessary, failure to provide such treatment
constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation.284 Because there is a consensus
among the medical community that GCS can be medically necessary, a
blanket ban must be rejected. First, the American Medical Association
(AMA), the largest and oldest association of medical professionals in the
United States,285 recognizes that GCS is medically necessary for some
patients experiencing gender dysphoria.286 Moreover, WPATH’s SOC
support the necessity of GCS for some patients.287 WPATH’s SOC are
widely accepted. They have been endorsed by the AMA; the Endocrine
Society; the APA; the American Psychological Association; the American
Academy of Family Physicians; the American Medical Student Association;
the National Commission on Correctional Health Care; the American Public
Health Association; the National Association of Social Workers; the
278. See id.
279. See supra note 170 and accompanying text; see also Kosilek v. Spencer, 774 F.3d 63,
74–79 (1st Cir. 2014) (stating that the expert testimony was presented in 2006).
280. See infra Part IV.B.
281. See Rezabek, supra note 53, at 417–18.
282. See supra 229 and accompanying text.
283. See infra Part IV.B.
284. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
285. Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165, 1176
(2020).
286. See Issue Brief: Health Insurance Coverage for Gender-Affirming Care of
Transgender Patients, AM. MED. ASS’N (2019), https://www.ama-assn.org/system/files/201903/transgender-coverage-issue-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7L2-HNRC].
287. See supra Part I.C.2.
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American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists; the American Society
of Plastic Surgeons; the World Health Organization; the American College
of Surgeons; GLMA: Health Professionals Advancing LGBTQ Equality; the
HIV Medicine Association; the Lesbian, Bisexual, Gay and Transgender
Physician Assistant Caucus; and Mental Health America.288 Further, with
the exception of the Fifth Circuit in Gibson, most courts recognize that
WPATH’s SOC are the proper guidelines for the treatment of gender
dysphoria.289 Even more compelling, there are “no other competing,
evidence-based standards that are accepted by any nationally or
internationally recognized medical professional groups.”290 As such, there
is a medical consensus that GCS is necessary for some individuals with
gender dysphoria.
B. Tools to Conduct a Case-by-Case Analysis
Given the fact-specific nature of this inquiry, courts should consider the
totality of the circumstances in deciding the constitutionality of a prison’s
denial of GCS.291 If, from the totality of the circumstances, a court
determines that GCS is necessary to alleviate an inmate’s gender dysphoria,
such denial will violate the Eighth Amendment. That being said, there are a
number of factors that should weigh heavily in a court’s assessment of the
necessity of GCS.
First, courts should consider whether an inmate’s symptoms persisted after
receiving other treatment. If, after receiving alternative treatment, a
prisoner’s actions indicate that their symptoms are alleviated, this would
signal the adequacy of the treatment provided.292 However, if after receiving
treatment, their actions suggest that their symptoms have persisted or
worsened, then this would indicate that GCS might be necessary.293 This
could be evidenced by the fact that, for example, even after being prescribed
hormones or other dysphoria treatments, the inmate continues to exhibit
symptoms of depression and continues to engage in acts of self-harm.
Second, courts should consider the patient’s own evaluation of the
treatment provided. Doctors rely heavily on their patients’ statements in
288. See Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757, 795 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), reh’g
denied, 949 F.3d 489 (9th Cir. 2020), stay denied sub nom. Idaho Dep’t of Corr. v. Edmo, 140
S. Ct. 2800 (2020) (Kagan, J., in chambers), and cert. denied, No. 19-1280, 2020 WL 6037411
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2020); WPATH Policy Statements: Position Statement on Medical Necessity of
Treatment, Sex Reassignment, and Insurance Coverage in the U.S.A., WORLD PRO. ASS’N FOR
TRANSGENDER HEALTH (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.wpath.org/newsroom/medicalnecessity-statement [https://perma.cc/DJJ3-9WNN].
289. See supra note 225 and accompanying text.
290. See Edmo v. Idaho Dep’t of Corr., 358 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1125 (D. Idaho 2018), aff’d
in part, vacated in part sub nom. Edmo v. Corizon, Inc., 935 F.3d 757.
291. See supra Part III.B.4 (discussing the fact-specific nature of Eighth Amendment
claims).
292. See supra notes 121–27 and accompanying text (discussing that the treatment
provided was adequate where it led to a significant improvement in the defendant’s condition).
293. See supra Part III.B.2 (explaining that the prison was aware of the inadequacy of the
treatment provided where symptoms persisted and worsened).
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prescribing treatments.294 Take, for example, a patient who complains of a
pain on the lower right-hand side of the body. The doctor may ask the patient
to describe the pain on a scale of one to ten to determine the appropriate
treatment. If the patient rates the pain as a one, the doctor may determine
that it is likely only soreness or a cramp and prescribe an aspirin. If, on the
other hand, the patient describes the pain as a nine or a ten, the doctor may
have reason to believe this is appendicitis and prescribe further testing and
maybe even hospitalization. Thus, a patient’s own assessment of symptoms
is crucial to diagnosis and treatment. There is good reason for this. First,
doctors cannot follow their patients around twenty-four hours a day, so they
cannot truly see the symptoms of the patients. Second, many ailments do not
have overtly physical manifestations and, thus, a doctor must rely on the
patient’s own description. This should be no different in the context of a
transgender prisoner.
Although weighing the inmate’s own evaluation could in theory create
incentives for inmates to make empty threats of self-harm, lie, or otherwise
exaggerate their illnesses to receive their desired treatments, this should not
be of substantial concern.295 Inmates’ statements are only one of many
factors that courts should consider in determining the necessity of GCS.
Thus, courts should be able to ferret out the artificial or exaggerated claims
by considering the totality of the circumstances. Moreover, this “problem”
is not unique to inmates seeking GCS but rather is applicable to all inmates
seeking a specific treatment.296 And yet, in other inadequate medical care
contexts, courts have mandated consideration of inmates’ own complaints.297
Thus, there is no reason to treat claims for GCS any differently.
Third, courts should rely heavily on the testimony of medical experts in
determining an inmate’s need for GCS. Courts already depend on expert
testimony when assessing medical claims “[b]oth inside and outside the

294. See Peter R. Lichstein, The Medical Interview, in CLINICAL METHODS: THE HISTORY,
PHYSICAL, AND LABORATORY EXAMINATIONS 29, 29 (H. Kenneth Walker et al. eds., 3d ed.
1990) (stating that the patient interview is the greatest diagnostic tool, producing more value
than either the physical examination or laboratory results).
295. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
296. Michael C. Friedman, Cruel and Unusual Punishment in the Provision of Prison
Medical Care: Challenging the Deliberate Indifference Standard, 45 VAND. L. REV. 921, 943
(1992) (“[M]alingering [is] very common among inmates. . . . [Prisoners] avail themselves of
prison health services because they are bored, they are lonely, they seek excuses from assigned
work, or they simply seek numbing medication.”(footnote omitted)).
297. See De’lonta v. Johnson, 708 F.3d 520, 525 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that the plaintiff
stated a cause of action for deliberate indifference where, “despite her repeated complaints to
[the prison] alerting them to the persistence of her symptoms and the inefficacy of her existing
treatment,” the prison failed to change her course of treatment); Easter v. Powell, 467 F.3d
459, 464 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that the defendant’s allegation that a prison nurse ignored
his complaints of chest pain was sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim); Greeno v.
Daley, 414 F.3d 645, 654–55 (7th Cir. 2005) (finding that the plaintiff stated a claim for
deliberate indifference where the prison refused to alter the defendant’s treatment “despite his
repeated reports that the medication was not working and his condition was getting worse”);
Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that ignoring
inmates’ complaints can amount to deliberate indifference).
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Eighth Amendment context.”298 This standard should apply with equal force
in the context of inmates seeking GCS. Evaluating the adequacy of a medical
treatment is “typically beyond the competence of a non-medical
professional.”299 Moreover, courts should pay particular attention to the
expert’s familiarity in treating transgender individuals.300 The more
experience a medical professional has with transgender health issues, the
more credibility the opinion should be given.
Finally, courts should consider whether an inmate qualifies for GCS under
WPATH’s SOC. The SOC lay out criteria that, if met, indicate the necessity
of GCS.301 The SOC were specifically created to assist medical
professionals in determining the best treatment for transgender patients.302
Moreover, the SOC are widely endorsed in the medical community.303
Therefore, they are a valuable and credible diagnostic source in determining
the necessity of GCS. However, because WPATH acknowledges that the
SOC are just “guidelines” and that treatment should be determined on an
individualized basis, courts should not just blindly adhere to them.304 It is
for this reason that WPATH’s SOC should just be one of the factors courts
consider when conducting a case-by-case analysis.
CONCLUSION
The Eighth Amendment was designed to respect fundamental human
dignity, to ensure that the needs of prisoners are adequately met, and
ultimately, to adapt and evolve alongside society’s values. In the wake of
heightened social awareness and a nationwide movement toward equality, it
would be contrary to the foundational principles of the Eighth Amendment
to broadly ignore the needs of transgender inmates. Instead, courts must
determine on a case-by-case basis the necessity of GCS and whether a
prison’s denial constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation. Any other
finding would simply be cruel and unusual.

298. See Braver, supra note 18, at 2270; see also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316
n.21 (2002); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
299. Pearson v. Prison Health Servs., 850 F.3d 526, 536 (3d Cir. 2017).
300. See Braver, supra note 18, at 2270 (stating that evaluating the adequacy of a prison’s
treatment of gender dysphoria requires testimony from “medical professionals familiar with
the diverse needs of individuals with gender dysphoria”).
301. See supra Part I.C.2.
302. See supra Part I.C.2.
303. See supra Part IV.A.4.
304. See supra note 102.

